

УДК 351.082

DOI: 10.35432/tisb322024319276

Наталія Колісниченко

*д.держ.упр., професор, завідувач кафедри соціально-гуманітарних наук
Навчально-наукового інституту публічної служби та управління
Національного університету «Одеська політехніка»
<https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1083-7990>
e-mail: ird@ukr.net*

СУЧАСНІ ПІДХОДИ ДО ФОРМУВАННЯ ТА РЕАЛІЗАЦІЇ ДЕРЖАВНОЇ ПОЛІТИКИ В КОНТЕКСТІ ВІДНОВЛЕННЯ УКРАЇНИ ТА ЇЇ СТІЙКОГО РОЗВИТКУ: ВРАХУВАННЯ ІНСАЙТІВ НІМЕЧЧИНИ

У статті вивчається досвід Німеччини щодо післявоєнної відбудови у контексті його застосування до процесів відновлення України в рамках формування та реалізації державної політики. Досліджуються такі сфери, як-от: розвиток інфраструктури; комунікація із зацікавленими сторонами; міжнародна допомога. Аналізуються приклади успішної післявоєнної відбудови суспільств після руйнівних конфліктів. Актуалізується значення цього досвіду для України, яка потребує вилучення уроків минулого у своєму майбутньому, щоб досягти успіху. Розглядаються приклади успішної реконструкції міст після війни в Німеччині, де руйнування міст розглядали як своєрідну можливість для впровадження нової, більш прогресивної архітектури. Акцент у новому плануванні робився на покращенні умов для проживання населення, на будівництві неокласичних адміністративно-культурних комплексів тощо. Загалом, післявоєнна відбудова Німеччини (її східної частини) мала такі важливі моменти, як: будівництво палаців, мегаплощ для демонстрацій, разом з тим здійснювалася активна робота з відновлення інфраструктури та житла; активне будівництво та благоустрій муніципального простору. Досвід Німеччини продемонстрував, що те, що відбувається після війни, може бути важливішим за саму війну. Розглядаються позитиви комунікаційної політики, співпраця зі стейкхолдерами. З досвіду Німеччини зроблено висновок, що відновлення країни залежить від: державних інвестицій (в різноманітні сфери з високим рівнем зайнятості, від сільського господарства до малого бізнесу); розвитку і просування «соціальної ринкової економіки», концепції, яка сприяла вільному ринковому капіталізму тощо. На сьогодні державна економіка України періоду воєнного стану надзвичайно залежить від зовнішньої підтримки. Значна частина поточної допомоги, а також майбутні фінансові обіцянки надходять не як гранти, а як позики.

Ключові слова: відбудова, відновлення, реконструкція, формування та реалізації державної політики, інфраструктура, комунікація, міжнародна допомога.

Natalia Kolisnichenko

*Doctor of Sciences in Public Administration, Full Professor,
Head of the Department of Social and Humanitarian Sciences
ESI of Public Service and Administration Odesa Polytechnic National University
<https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1083-7990>
e-mail: ird@ukr.net*

CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO PUBLIC POLICY MAKING AND IMPLEMENTATION IN THE CONTEXT OF UKRAINE'S RECOVERY AND ITS SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: CONSIDERING THE INSIGHTS OF GERMANY

The paper examines Germany's experience in post-war reconstruction and its application to Ukraine's recovery processes within the framework of public policy making and implementation. It explores such areas as infrastructure development, communication with stakeholders, and

international assistance. Successful examples of post-war rebuilding after destructive conflicts are analyzed. The relevance of this experience for Ukraine is highlighted, emphasizing the importance of learning from past lessons to achieve future success. The article considers examples of successful post-war city reconstruction in Germany, where urban destruction was treated as an opportunity to introduce new, more progressive architecture. The new planning emphasized improving living conditions for the city residents, the construction of neoclassical administrative-cultural complexes, and more. Overall, post-war reconstruction in Germany (particularly in its eastern part) included key elements such as the construction of palaces, mega-squares for demonstrations, along with active efforts to restore infrastructure and housing, and the development and beautification of municipal spaces. Germany's experience demonstrated that what happens after the war can be more important than the war itself. The paper also highlights the positives of communication policy and collaboration with stakeholders. From Germany's experience, it is concluded that a country's recovery depends on investments (in various sectors with high employment levels, from agriculture to small businesses) and the development and promotion of a «social market economy», a concept that fostered free-market capitalism. Currently, Ukraine's wartime economy heavily depends on external support. A significant portion of the current aid, as well as future financial commitments, comes not as grants but as loans.

Keywords: rebuilding, recovery, reconstruction, formation and implementation of public policy, infrastructure, communication, international assistance.

The formulation of the problem. The principles of reconstruction are discussed in many political, scientific, analytical documents, including various strategies, programs, plans, roadmaps etc. These documents emphasize the importance of partnership, coordination, transparency, adherence to rules and laws, democratic participation, involvement of multiple stakeholders, inclusivity, sustainability, goal alignment, and accountability. These principles are applicable to all cases of recovery from war and natural disasters. For instance, World Bank [5] initiated the principle of «building back better»: reconstruction and reforms aimed at enhancing efficiency and growth should go hand in hand. While addressing various tasks on reconstruction, the government and donors should work towards advancing structural reforms in Ukraine.

The role of Germany assistance to Ukraine in the war started by Russia is enormous. The country contributes into: entrepreneurs and businesses; reconstruction of critical infrastructure; supporting social issues solution.

Analysis of recent research and publications. The problem of country's recovery has been the target of attention for a number of researchers. For example, Bogumil J. and Holtkamp L. studied local politics and administration in the context of reconstruction; Geary G. and Bayley Ch. explored modern economic history under rebuilding. The issues of Germany's reconstruction after World War II were analyzed by Furkert L., Syssner J., Siebert C. and others.

The aim of the paper. The aim of the paper is to examine the insights of Germany experience in their application to the processes of Ukraine's recovery within its public policy formation and realization.

The main body of the paper and the obtained results. At the Ukraine Recovery Conference URC2024 «United in Defence. United in Recovery. Stronger together» held in Berlin, Germany some findings on this issue were made [12]. During all years of Ukraine-Russia war Germany supported and supporting Ukraine's socio-economic development. It contributes greatly into Ukraine's reconstruction, including securing and rebuilding critical infrastructure, such as in the energy sector, the defence industry, social infrastructure, reconstruction of critical infrastructure and private sector development, agriculture and processing, contributing to the resilience of Ukraine and its defence. Nowadays Ukraine offers investment opportunities in various sectors, ranging from energy and infrastructure to agro-processing and digital technologies [9].

Several spheres are of country's focus.

Infrastructure development.

At the beginning of the war Ukraine was almost unprotected by air defense forces. More than 70 percent of Ukraine's population lives in cities [13]. Therefore, the reconstruction of Ukraine is the reconstruction of cities. After massive bombing of Ukrainian cities and towns the country needs the experience on their reconstruction. There are many examples of successful post-war reconstruction of societies, which means there are grounds for optimism. Countries can quickly revive their economies after devastating conflicts. Ukraine needs to apply the lessons of the past to its future to achieve success. Examples of successful urban reconstruction after wars include cities in Germany.

In Germany after the World War II they considered the destruction of cities as a kind of opportunity for the introduction of a new, more progressive architecture. The emphasis in the new planning was on improving sanitary conditions for people regarding streets and apartments, on the construction of neoclassical administrative and cultural complexes, etc. There were so called 2 ways of reconstruction – just after the war and after the collapse of East Germany in 1990 when the citizens being joined into various communities wanted their old towns back, restored to its former, historically grown identity. For instance, in Dresden on July 13, 1945 the «Committee for the Reconstruction of the City of Dresden» was formed. Despite the emergency situation, which required urgent measures, the city management announced a competition for urban renewal projects [14].

The city residents with architects, art historians, and many other disciplines involved, started mobilizing the people for their ideas on reconstruction of as many historic buildings as possible. They got in touch with decision-makers and investors and tried to convince them with historic construction plans, old pictures and professional advice [6]. The audit showed that in order for the city to return to full life, the construction of at least 80 buildings is necessary. The task was somewhat simplified by the fact that the city's infrastructure - roads, water supply, sewerage - mostly survived [14].

The works of both professionals and enthusiasts who wanted to express their point of view on the redesign of the urban landscape had an impressive result. The works were provided according to the concept which was formulated in the USSR as the antithesis of the Athens Charter of Cities. The structure of the city consisted of a political center with squares, avenues for marches, demonstrations, and working neighborhoods. «Cities are built by industry for industry» is the crux of the concept [14].

But Dresden is not only historical monuments. After the bombing, about 300 people were left homeless. They were joined by refugees from the eastern provinces, who were destroyed without any chance of recovery. It was necessary to urgently provide housing for impoverished families. The apartments that suffered minor damage were repaired. Another had to be built from scratch. In the early 50s, for the mass construction of housing throughout the GDR, housing and construction cooperatives (AWG) were organized, which received plots for development from the government and carte blanche for work. With the arrival of the Khrushchev thaw in Dresden, they stopped building buildings in the style of the Stalinist Empire and switched to the WBS 70 project, common to the entire GDR - the construction of prefabricated houses from reinforced concrete panels. Firstly, it solved the problem of housing shortage, and secondly, as recent experience has shown, panels turned out to be a grateful material for renovation [14]. Significant tax incentives were offered to spark investment in the real estate sector of the former East Germany, and a speculative boom followed, eventually resulting in a housing supply that far outstripped demand [8].

Unlike the other Soviet-camp states of eastern Europe, East Germany had been part of an advanced capitalist economy before the war, which gave it a considerable advantage in reconstruction. Its surviving industrial infrastructure, inherited skills, and high level of scientific and technical education enabled it to develop the economy and to advance the standard of living to a level markedly higher than those of most other socialist countries, though living standards were still

well below those of western Europe.

East Germany had a command economy, in which virtually all decisions were made by the governing communist party, the Socialist Unity Party (SED). The system of planning was inflexible and eventually caused ruinous economic conditions. East Germany's industrial sector lacked quality controls and technological innovation [7].

Nowadays German housing stock is generally of good quality, though there is a considerable discrepancy between eastern and western Germany. In the territory of the former West Germany, the stock is modern, some three-fourths of its dwellings having been built since the end of World War II. In contrast, eastern German housing stock is significantly older, about half of it having been built prior to the end of the war. The private sector provides most of the capital for new housing. However, the federal government's building savings policy offers loans to those who save for a prescribed period to build or purchase a home. Much of the housing built with government subsidies is allocated to "social housing"—dwellings provided at "cost rent" far below the market rental value to families with many children, people with disabilities, the elderly, and persons with low incomes [7].

So, the post-war reconstruction in Germany (its eastern part) had such important moments as: the construction of forums, political palaces, mega-squares for demonstrations, and at the same time - active work of restoring infrastructure and housing; the reunification of Germany started active construction and beautification of spaces. The consequences of the war for the country had a long "history": division into 4 occupation zones; about 12 years of the path to economic leadership. Ukraine can get several useful insights from Germany experience: stabilization of the currency and perception of its stability; effective planning of expenditures of public funds and strict financial discipline; reduction of the state's share in the economy and tax flexibility; investment in science and rapid implementation of domestic innovative solutions; retraining of the population to work in promising fields; attraction of international investments; encouraging the export of competitive goods in contrast to the prevailing pre-war sales.

The case of Germany demonstrated that what happens after the war can be more important than the war itself.

Communication with stakeholders.

In their research on Local Governments and the Communication of Demographic Decline in Sweden and Germany Syssner J. and Siebert C. make several observations after questioning of informants [10]: the informants make a distinction between the communicative task of politicians versus that of civil servants; make a distinction between specialists and generalists – among both politicians and civil servants; informants refer to press officers and other professional communicators as being essential to the communication of political decisions. Besides, all of informants fulfil a dual role, as they represented both their respective political party and the local government. In addition, each German informant maintained a dual local government function, being both the chairman of the council and the chief executive of the administration [4, p. 40].

Some conclusions from the research: local governmental communication initiatives is a means of gathering knowledge, ideas, and input from citizens; the aim of local governmental communication is often understood as explaining the state of affairs to citizens.

To implement collaboration with stakeholders, the process of its setting up can be broken down into 3 steps [2]:

Step 1: This preliminary step serves to identify stakeholders and engage them in the process to develop a common vision, joint objectives, and expected results.

Step 2: During this step, a more detailed analysis of the stakeholder engagement process and governance mechanisms will be carried out, in a joint manner, to define the most appropriate governance structures, decision-making processes, and operational methods to use.

Step 3: In this step a governance system must be established, which requires good communication and the active involvement of all stakeholders throughout the entire process.

A participatory evaluation and continuous improvement of the process is implemented. An authority can adapt this methodology at any time to suit its local circumstances. For instance, depending on the scope of activities, timeline and budget, the regional/local authority may decide to implement some activities in parallel. Such experience is useful for Ukraine.

International assistance.

In addition to Germany's recovery there was the European Recovery Program, better known as the Marshall Plan which saw the United States giving more than \$15 billion to European nations affected by World War II, with a large chunk of this money going to Germany. Though it should be mentioned that money alone was clearly not enough. The successes of West Germany resulted from initial conditions and institutional reforms, in addition to the aid provided. Much of West Germany's success was attributed to currency reform, strict adherence to property rights, and the abolition of price controls.

The «German economic miracle» or Wirtschaftswunder had its origins at the end of World War II when much of the country was in ruins [11]. It was concluded from the Germany experience that the recovery of the country depended on: state investment (across a variety of high-employment areas, from agriculture, to small businesses); development and promotion of the «social market economy», a concept that promoted free-market capitalism while allowing government involvement in creating social policies etc.

The Ukrainian state-led war economy is extremely dependent on external support. Much of the current aid, as well as future financial pledges, come not as grants, but loans. These will have to be paid back and will add to the mounting debt. Donor institutions such as the IMF have acknowledged the perils of unsustainable debt and the resulting fiscal austerity that harms people and suffocates economic growth [3].

«Building back better, made in Ukraine» also means that donors and foreign investors should prioritise local firms when allocating funds and make them primary contractors. As many goods as possible should be procured from Ukrainian producers. Foreign companies should be encouraged to pursue localisation and form joint ventures with Ukrainian companies. As much funding as possible should go to small- and medium-sized enterprises. Ukrainian companies have the manufacturing capacity (e.g., cement, steel) in the sectors most in need of reconstruction, such as residential housing and infrastructure. They are also competitive in the defence, food, garments and medical sectors. Local contracting and localisation will generate domestic demand, provide jobs and attract some returnees. It will generate higher and more sustainable growth because money will stay in the economy rather than leaving the country through foreign contractors or, worse, foreign contractors using foreign labour and imported building materials [3].

The important principle is grants rather than loans. Ukraine devastated by war is unlikely to be able to repay additional debts. Increasing the volume of loans raises the risk of a debt crisis. In this context, it is noteworthy that the funds from the Marshall Plan were provided mainly as grants. For investments to be effective and reforms not to be rolled back, responsibility for the recovery process must lie with Ukraine. Only Ukraine can determine its future. Ukraine will use aid most effectively if the nature of the aid aligns with its own interests.

Moreover, reconstruction cannot rely solely on funds from governments and international organizations. The participation of private capital is necessary, for example, in the form of direct foreign investment in Ukraine and public-private partnerships (PPPs). Such partnerships will bring not only funds but also technologies and management practices.

So, to conclude, after World War II, the Marshall Plan played a key role in the reconstruction of European cities. We expect that similar efforts will be made to rebuild the damaged cities of Ukraine. The reconstruction of cities in Germany after World War II took more than ten years. Technological progress and the introduction of economic incentives can play a key role in helping Ukraine accelerate this process.

Reconstruction requires strategic planning, oversight and donor coordination. A dedicated

National Development Agency could be set up to ensure that funds reach the people and to align reconstruction with EU accession [3].

The presented experience allows to define the principles of Ukraine's recovery:

Ukraine-centric principle of reconstruction (a fundamental principle is that the reconstruction must be «Ukraine-centric»: aid programs should be aligned with Ukraine's ultimate goals);

principle of institutionalisation (a new institutional framework, possibly based on post-war recovery in Ukraine, can ensure the development of institutional capacity and the accumulation of experience and integrate Ukrainian institutions with EU institutions);

principle of participation (for the EU Ukraine must become a truly global player and change its decision-making system);

principle of decentralization aspiration (national reconstruction priorities, such as its infrastructure, communication ties and attraction of international funds, should take precedence);

principle of efficient communication (various ways must be found to guarantee the independence of the media from the government while avoiding excessive private sector interests in monopolizing major media);

project-oriented principle (the development of projects and usage of the principle of co-financing, so that both the Ukrainian public and private sectors are invested in the implementation of various projects at various levels).

Conclusions and prospects for further research. Reconstruction must outline the contours of the future from the very beginning to ensure that the institutions necessary for rebuilding are resilient. However, for the reconstruction process to inspire confidence, the Ukrainian people must understand that the path to prosperity will take years, if not decades. There is a crucial role of local government in this process. The successful decentralization reform places significantly more responsibility on local governments for the well-being of the people. Local governments develop regional development strategies, in particular, roadmaps, for the development of infrastructure for both people and businesses. Based on the experience of the Marshall Plan (which included productivity missions to transfer advanced technologies from the US to Europe), reconstruction for Ukraine is an opportunity to «leapfrog» to a new level of technology. Reconstruction can and should enable significant economic and institutional modernization. The goal should be a greener, more inclusive, and dynamic post-war Ukraine. Prospects for further scientific exploration are research possibilities in creative application of best foreign experience for Ukraine's recovery.

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